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Abstract 
This article analyzes how shareholder protection has developed in 20 countries 
from 1995 to 2005. In contrast to traditional legal research, it draws on a quanti-
tative methodology to law (“leximetrics”, “numerical comparative law”). Some 
of its results are that in most countries shareholder protection has improved in 
the last years; that developed countries perform better than developing countries 
in protecting shareholders; that shareholder protection in common law countries 
is relatively similar whereas there is no comparable similarity within the Ger-
man and French civil law families; that German corporate law is “more main-
stream” and US corporate law is “more eccentric” than the law of the other 
countries; and that in general there has been convergence in the last decade. In 
order  to  explain  these  results,  the  distinction  between  origin  and  transplant 
countries can be useful. However, in contrast to previous studies, this does not 
mean that all depends on the distinction between English, French and German 
origin and transplant countries. Rather it is decisive (a) which “version” of the 
corporate law the transplant country copied, (b) whether transplant countries 
continue  to  take  developments  in  the  origin  countries  into  account  and  (c) 
whether transplant countries have left the path of their (former) origin countries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, the question whether and how shareholders should be protected has 
been intensively debated. Lucian Bebchuk found that shareholders hardly ever 
use the power to challenge directors.
1 He suggested that this should be remedied 
by reducing impediments to replace directors and by improving shareholders 
power to change the company’s charter.
2 This has evoked many critical com-
ments. These critics bring forward that shareholders lack proper incentives to 
act for the corporation as a whole,
3 that board control is beneficial to the share-
holders
4 and that the director primacy of US law has worked well in the last 
decades.
5 However, there has also been some support for a strengthening of 
shareholder rights. For instance, it has been said that the existing rights have to 
be made more effective
6 and that “shareholders would enjoy greater, longer-
lasting happiness by using their shares to have a participatory role”.
7 
 
Outside the US, the protection of shareholders is also topical. In the EU, the 
European  Parliament  has  just  approved  a  Directive  on  Shareholder  Rights.
8 
Here, critics object that this Directive addresses topics which should better be 
left to the companies themselves, such as, for example, the use of the new me-
dia in the run-up and at the general meeting.
9 Furthermore, this Directive may 
also be an unnecessary irritant to national corporate laws, which may already 
protect shareholders sufficiently.
10 Internationally, the OECD Principles of Cor-
porate Governance emphasize that “the corporate governance framework should 
protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights”.
11 These principles are 
important because IMF and World Bank as well as investors use them as a 
benchmark for good corporate governance.
12 However, critics may here refer to 
the fact that these principles are based on a Western model of corporate law 
which may not be suitable in other parts of the world.
13 
 
This article will analyze how these discussions relate to the legal development 
of shareholder protection of 20 countries. This will be done with a quantitative 
methodology (“leximetrics”,
14 “numerical comparative law”
15), which will be 
explained in Part II of this article. Part III presents the results of this leximetric 
approach. In particular, it will be examined whether there are profound differ-
ences  between  different  groups  of  countries  (such  as,  for  instance,  between 
common law and civil law countries; developed and developing countries). Part 
IV provides possible explanations for these differences. Part V concludes. 
    
II. LEXIMETRICS: CHOICE AND CODING VARIABLES FOR SHAREHOLDER  
      PROTECTION 
 
A. Previous research 
Usually lawyers follow a qualitative approach because, apart from citation to 
statutes or cases, they do not use numbers and do not make calculations. In con-
trast to this, leximetrics refers to every quantitative measurement of law. With 
respect to shareholder protection, the most famous attempt to quantify the law is 
the study by La Porta et al. on Law and Finance.
16 La Porta et al. used eight 
variables as proxies for shareholder protection in 49 countries. These variables 
coded the law for “one share one vote”, “proxy by mail allowed”, “shares not 
blocked  before  the  meeting”,  “cumulative  voting”,  “oppressed  minorities 
mechanism”, “pre-emptive rights to new issues”, “share capital required to call 
an extraordinary shareholder meeting” and “mandatory dividend”. In a second 
step, they draw on these numbers as independent variables for statistical regres-
sions. Their main finding was that good shareholder protection leads to more 
dispersed shareholder ownership, which can be seen as a proxy for developed 
capital markets. 
 
However, it is doubtful whether the findings of La Porta et al. are accurate. 
Various studies have identified many coding errors.
17 A further problem is that 
La Porta et al.’s choice of variables does not provide a meaningful picture of the 
legal protection of shareholders. La Porta et al.’s variables not only suffer from 
a US bias but are also a poor proxy for shareholder protection in general, be-
cause their variables do not capture the most significant aspects of the law.
18  
 
Lele and Siems made a fresh start for a quantification of shareholder protection 
(“Leximetric I”).
19 We built a new shareholder protection index for five coun-
tries (Germany, France, UK, US and India) and coded the development of the 
law over three decades. In particular, we took into account that different legal 
instruments can be used to achieve a similar function. We also extended the 
number of variables to 60. Furthermore, we addressed the various problems re-
lated to the coding of legal provisions. For instance, we made clear how we 
dealt  with  ambiguous  legal  provisions  and  to  what  extent  we  coded  non-
mandatory and soft law. Further, our article gave examples of the interesting 
possibilities that diligent quantification of legal rules provides for comparing 
variations across time and across legal systems. For instance, it was found: that 
shareholder protection has been improving in the last three decades; that the 
protection of minority against majority shareholders is considerably stronger in 
blockholder countries; and that convergence in shareholder protection has been 
taking place since 1993 and has been increasing since 2001.    
This article (“Leximetric II”) ties in with Lele and Siems’s coding of share-
holder protection. However, on the one hand, it is more extensive because it 
deals with not 5 but 20 countries. On the other hand, it is narrower because it 
only uses ten variables and looks at the years 1995-2005. This reduction was 
partly based on pragmatic reasons because the compilation and coding of legal 
rules across time is very complex and time-consuming. Furthermore, it has to be 
borne in mind that an index cannot take all aspects of shareholder protection 
into account. As the company law of most countries consists of several hundred 
sections or articles, the coding of all the details would lead to an unworkable in-
dex of several hundred (or thousand) variables. Thus, it was necessary to con-
struct a limited number of core variables, which can function as a proxy for 
shareholder protection in general. This led to the following list: 
 




Description and Coding 
1. Powers of the 
general meeting 
for de facto 
changes 
If the sale of more than 50 % of the company’s assets requires approval of the 
general meeting it equals 1; if the sale of more than 80 % of the assets requires 






Equals 1 if shareholders who hold 1 % or less of the capital can put an item on 
the agenda; equals 0.75 if there is a hurdle of more than 1 % but not more than 
3%; equals 0.5 if there is a hurdle of more than 3 % but not more than 5%; 
equals 0.25 if there is a hurdle of more than 5% but not more than 10 %; 





Equals 1 if (1) postal voting is possible or (2) proxy solicitation with two-way 
voting proxy form
21 has to be provided by the company (i.e. the directors or 
managers); equals 0.5 if (1) postal voting is possible if provided in the articles 
or allowed by the directors, or (2) the company has to provide a two-way 
proxy form but not proxy solicitation; equals 0 otherwise. 





Equals 1 if there is a prohibition of multiple voting rights; equals 2/3 if only 
companies which already have multiple voting rights can keep them; equals 
1/3 if state approval is necessary; equals 0 otherwise. 





Equals 1 if at least half of the board members
24 must be independent; equals 
0.5 if 25 % of them must be independent;
25 equals 0 otherwise 
 
6. Feasibility of 
director’s dis-
missal 
Equals 0 if good reason is required for the dismissal of directors;
26 equals 0.25 
if directors can always be dismissed but are always compensated for dismissal 
without good reason;
27 equals 0.5 if directors are not always compensated for 
dismissal without good reason but they could have concluded a non-fixed-
term contract with the company;
28 equals 0.75 if in cases of dismissal without 
good reason directors are only compensated if compensation is specifically 
contractually agreed; equals 1 if there are no special requirements for dis-
missal and no compensation has to be paid.    
Note: If there is a statutory limit on the amount of compensation, this can lead 







Equals 0 if this is typically excluded (e.g., because of strict subsidiarity re-
quirement, hurdle which is at least 20 %); equals 0.5 if there are some restric-
tions (e.g., certain percentage of share capital;
30 demand requirement); equals 








Equals 1 if every shareholder can file a claim against a resolution by the gen-
eral meeting;
31 equals 0.5 if there is a threshold of 10 % voting rights;
32 equals 




Equals 1 if there is a mandatory public bid for the entirety of shares in case of 
purchase of 30% or 1/3 of the shares; equals 0.5 if the mandatory bid is trig-
gered at a higher percentage (such as 40 or 50 %); further, it equals 0.5 if there 
is a mandatory bid but the bidder is only required to buy part of the shares; 
equals 0 if there is no mandatory bid at all. 
10. Disclosure 
of major share 
ownership 
Equals 1 if shareholders who acquire at least 3 % of the companies capital 
have to disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 5 % of the capital; equals 0.5 if 
this concerns 10 %; equals 0.25 if this concerns 25 %; equals 0 otherwise 
 
 
The choice of these variables was, first, based on the aim to get a representative 
mixture of legal rules. Thus, the index includes: variables on the power of the 
general meeting and on who decides about its topics (variables 1 and 2); on how 
voting takes place (variables 3 and 4); on whether directors take the sharehold-
ers interests into account (variables 5 and 6); on which legal actions sharehold-
ers can file (variables 7 and 8), and on how shareholders are protected in the 
event of a change of corporate control (variables 9 and 10). Second, it had to be 
decided which specific legal questions to code. Here, it may be seen as a sur-
prise that, for instance, the index includes the “powers of the general meeting 
for de facto changes” (variable 1) but not the more ordinary powers to elect the 
directors, amend the articles or decide about mergers. However, as it is the aim 
of this index to examine differences, variables had to be chosen where differ-
ences could be expected. This can also be seen in other variables. For example, 
it was examined whether the ability of shareholders to anticipate a decision of 
the directors was facilitated (variable 3). Conversely, it would have been unin-
teresting just to examine whether anticipation is “possible” because some kind 
of proxy voting is admissible in all countries. Third, not all legal questions are 
codeable. For instance, it is difficult to code case law on fiduciary duties be-
cause this crucially depends on the facts of the specific cases. Thus, variables 
were chosen for which consistent coding could best be achieved.    
It may be objected that some of the variables do not really protect shareholders. 
For instance, the mandatory bid (variable 9) protects shareholders because it 
gives them an opportunity to exit the company for compensation; but indirectly 
it may be harmful because it may discourage takeover activity.
33 However, that 
is not a relevant point here. The purpose of the index is “just” to provide a de-
scription of the legal rules on shareholder protection and not to answer the nor-
mative question whether and how shareholders should be protected.
34 This will, 
however, be examined in the future as this index will constitute a basis for an 





The description of the variables
36 contains some explanation of how the vari-
ables have been coded. In other respect, the coding follows the methodology 
developed in Lele and Siems.
37 The main points are as follows. The index coded 
the law applicable to listed companies. Mandatory as well as default rules, and 
statutory as well as case law were taken into account. Listing rules, takeover 
codes and corporate governance codes were also considered.
38 The US coding 
was based on Delaware corporate law and the Canadian coding was based on 
federal corporate law. Finally, non-binary coding (½, ¼, ⅜, ¾ etc.) was allowed 
if this was necessary to provide an accurate picture of the law.
39 
 
The full text of the index (10 variables, 11 years, 20 countries = 2200 observa-
tions) plus the explanations have led to a document of 104 pages which will be 
published on the Internet.
40 Thus, only four brief points are highlighted here. 
First, the variables on independent board members and on mandatory bid (vari-
ables 5 and 9) have improved most significantly in most countries.
41 Second, the 
variables on feasibility of directors’ dismissal and on shareholder action against 
the general meeting (variables 6 and 8) have, by contrast, hardly changed in any 
of the countries.
42 Third, the variables on shareholder action against the general 
meeting and on disclosure of major shareholder ownership (variables 8 and 10) 
display the best scores in most of the countries.
43 Fourth, by contrast, the vari-
ables  on  anticipation  of  shareholder  decision  facilitated  and  on  independent 
board members (variables 3 and 5) are on average the weakest variables.
44 
    
III. LEXIMETRIC RESULTS 
 
A. Shareholder protection aggregate 
An aggregate of all ten variables for all countries leads to twenty curves which 
indicate the protection of shareholders from 1995 to 2005: 
 



































One can observe that the countries at the bottom of the figure have slightly im-
proved their scoring. In 1995 the lowest score was 1.8 while in 2005 it was 3.4. 
Similarly, most other countries move constantly upwards. Exceptionally, Bra-
zil’s score first dropped and then improved again. Furthermore, the best coun-
tries have not managed to rise higher. Thus, there appears to be an upper limit at 
ca. 7.5. The explanation for this can be that too much shareholder protection can 
work as overkill because it excessively restricts companies.
45 Thus, it could be 
the case that 7.5 is some kind of optimum of shareholder protection and coun-
tries would be ill advised to go beyond it. 
    
For more specific observations on particular countries it is useful to present the 
aggregate in a different format:
 46 
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According to Figure 2, most developed countries perform better than develop-
ing countries. This is no surprise because either developed countries tend to 
have better law-making institutions or it may be because their advanced legal 
system promotes economic development.
47 Apart from that, generalizations are 
difficult. In particular, there is no clear division between legal families, since 
one of the best three and one of the worst three countries is a common law 
country (Canada and Pakistan). A conclusion which one may draw however is 
that countries whose corporate law is influenced by different traditions may 
profit from this (regarding Japan: German and US law;
48 regarding Canada: UK 
and US law; regarding the UK: its own tradition and EU law; regarding France: 
its own tradition and Anglo-Saxon traditions
49). Finally, the bottom of the “list” 
appears to be dominated, apart from Pakistan, by countries from Eastern Europe 
and Latin America.
50  
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Comparing 1995 and 2005 one can observe first, that most countries have im-
proved their scoring. This concerns above all some of the transition and devel-
oping countries who are now catching up with the developed world. For in-
stance, the scores of Pakistan, Mexico, the Czech Republic and Latvia have im-
proved  slightly.  Significant  progress  has  also  been  made  by  China.  Second, 
however, the overall “ranking” of the countries and thus the lead of developed 
countries has remained relatively untouched. The top five countries of 1995 – 
all of them developed countries (Japan, France, Canada, UK, US) – are also at 
the top in 2005. Germany and Italy have also made some progress. Third, some 
countries have not changed or have even dropped a little bit. Apart from the top-
performers Japan and Canada, this concerns in particular Switzerland.  
 
The strong Chinese and the weak Swiss performance in the 2005 index may be 
most surprising. However, this result does not mean that shareholders in Swit-
zerland are more at risk than in China since the efficiency of courts also has to 
be taken into account. Thus, it is useful to consider a “rule of law” ranking 
which is based on the World Bank Governance Indicators:
51  
    
Figure 4: Rule of Law 1996                         
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Figure 5: Rule of Law 2005                         
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As one would expect, Figures 4 and 5 show that developed countries perform 
better than developing countries. It is also interesting to see how the countries 
on the bottom of the table have developed. In contrast to the shareholder index, 
where most countries have moved up, changes have here not been consistent. 
Whereas the Indian, Latvian and Czech scores have improved, the Pakistani, 
Mexican and Argentine scores have got worse. A likely explanation for this is 
that copying legal rules is easier than addressing the inefficiency of courts.
52 
  
B. Differences and similarities 
At first glance, just looking at the previous figures, one may get the impression 
that, for instance, in 2005 the US and French law on shareholder protection 
were identical because both countries had the same score of 7.25 out of 10 vari-
ables. This would, however, not be a fair assessment. As the previous figures 
simply show the aggregate of all the variables, it is perfectly possible, and in-
deed is the case, that different variables have led to the same scores for the US 
and France. Therefore to highlight the differences between the countries with a 
view to identifying trends of convergence or divergence the differences between 
each variable in the law of a particular legal system and the same variable in the 
law of the other countries have been calculated. Subsequently, the absolute val-
ues of these differences have been added together and represented graphically.
53  
 
First, this was done for the three so called “origin countries”: UK, France and 
Germany (infra 1-3). If, as it is claimed, the law of these countries has influ-
enced the laws of the other countries of the world,
54 one may expect clear-cut 
distinctions between English common law, French civil law and German civil 
law countries. Second, it is interesting to examine the differences and similari-
ties from US law (infra 4). This was done because it is sometimes said that there 
has been a significant “Americanization” of the laws of other countries in recent 
years.
55 Third, one can calculate the difference between each country and all 
other  countries  of our  index.  This  makes  it  possible  to  establish  the  “main-
streamness” or “eccentricity” of each legal system’s approach to shareholder 
protection as well as the convergence or divergence of shareholder protection in 
general (infra 5, 6). 
    
1. Differences from UK law 
 












 MX CL LV IT PK CZ CH ES BR JP DE IN AR CN FR ZA US CA MY
 












 MX CL LV IT PK CZ CH ES BR JP DE IN AR CN FR ZA US CA MY
 
    
On the one hand, the 1995 figure displays some similarity between the UK and 
the other common law countries. Malaysia, Canada and the US are most similar 
to UK law and the scores of South Africa and India – at least mixed legal sys-
tems
56 – are also not very different. On the other hand, against a mere explana-
tion by legal origins militates that Pakistan’s law on shareholder protection is 
very different from UK law. Moreover, France and China may be surprising 
close to the UK. With respect to Latin America, Chile and Mexico are quite dif-
ferent but the intermediate scores of Argentina and Brazil make it difficult to 
generalize. 
 
Taking into account the 2005 figure, the situation does not become considerably 
clearer.  French,  Indian,  South  African,  Japanese  and  Brazilian  law  have  di-
verged from UK law whilst Chinese, Canadian, Czech, Chilean and Italian law 
have converged to it. It must also be noted that some of the changes are rela-
tively small and thus should not be overrated. But at least the fact that a number 
of changes have taken place shows that not only the origins of a particular law 
but also (or even primarily) later developments matter.
57 
 
2. Differences from French law 
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The 1995 figure confirms that categorizations are difficult. The other (allegedly) 
French legal origin countries (Brazil, Spain, Argentina, Italy, Chile and Mex-
ico)
58 occupy very different positions in the list. The European countries mainly 
have intermediate scores. Given the European directives on corporate law,
59 this 
may be seen as a surprise. Yet, the explanation for this could be that in the 
1980s French law was already influenced by Anglo-Saxon concepts, such as 
with respect to takeover regulation and financial disclosure.
60 This is also con-
firmed by the fact that in 1995 US law was remarkably similar to French law. 
 
However, in 2005 the laws of other continental European countries have also 
converged with French law. The reason for this is that now these countries too 
have incorporated some Anglo-Saxon concepts into their law.
61 Apart from that, 
generalizations  according  to  different  legal  origins  are  once  again  difficult. 
Pakistan has converged whereas the UK and the US have slightly diverged. 
Chile has diverged, Argentina and Mexico have converged and Brazil remained 
relatively unchanged. 
    
3. Differences from German law 
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The general striking feature about the 1995 figure is that the differences be-
tween Germany and the other countries are relatively small. Only Canada and 
France differ more than four points from Germany. This contrasts with the pre-
vious figures because in 1995 there were six countries which differed more than    
four points from UK law and seven countries which differed more than four 
points from French law.
62 Thus, German corporate law is “more mainstream” 
than the law of the UK and France. 
 
This did not change fundamentally in 2005. Yet, there are movements in differ-
ent directions. Chinese law has become remarkably similar to German law. Ca-
nadian law has also slightly converged, whereas US and UK law have diverged 
from German law. This illustrates that the notion of legal families is not only 
about “legal origins” but also about on-going influences on particular countries. 
Thus, it is not the abstract question of legal origins but the specific question of 
why particular legal changes take place which is crucial.
63 
 
4. Differences from US law 
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Given the American influence on Japanese and French law,
64 it is no surprise 
that in 1995 these legal systems were relatively close to the US. There is also 
some similarity between the US and the common law countries Canada, UK, 
India and Malaysia. Yet, in general, it is remarkable that US law appears to be 
quite exceptional.
65 Eight countries differ more than four points from US law, in 




In 2005 this exceptionalism did not change. Thus, the claim that there has been 
an Americanization of the law of the other countries
67 cannot be confirmed. In 
particular, the difference of continental European and Latin American countries 
to US law has not been reduced considerably. 
    
5. Differences from average 
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It is difficult to say which results one would expect from a calculation of the 
“differences from average”. On the one hand, one may contemplate that the law 
of successful countries is special because they have managed to create particu-
larly sophisticated systems of corporate law. On the other hand, it could be em-
phasized that corporate law has to find a balance between different interests, so 
that every deviation from the international average (in either direction) could be 
harmful. Then, one would expect the most economically successful countries to 
be least similar to the other legal systems. The reality, however, does not con-
firm either of these theories. In 1995 as well as in 2005 (Figures 14 and 15) 




6. Average of everything 
 










Figure 16 displays the mean of the differences from average,
68 and thus answers 
the general question of whether shareholder protection in the twenty countries 
has converged or diverged.
69 The resultant curve indicates constant convergence 
until 2003. Then, however, it stopped and the law has slightly started to diverge. 
Why was there divergence in 2004? According to the Figure 17 on the differ-
ences from average, German and UK law led to this development because both 
curves went up, which means that their laws became more different from the 
laws of the other countries.    






























Which developments in German and UK law caused this divergence? Remarka-
bly, in both countries it was only one variable that changed. In Germany since 
2004 multiple voting rights are excluded in all cases,
70 and thus the value of its 
variable 4 became “1”. In the UK, since 2004 the Combined Code recommends 
that at least half of the board members should be independent,
71 and thus the 
value of its variable 5 became “1”. These maximum scores are special because, 
with respect to variable 4 the 19 other countries have only the average value 
0.58, and with respect to variable 5 the 19 other countries have only the average 
value 0.33. As a result, one should not over-interpret the 2004 divergence of 
Figure 16. This caveat is reinforced by the fact that our previous study on 5 




IV. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
 
Various reasons have been offered to explain why countries differ in their pro-
tection of shareholders, such as, for instance, the differences between developed 
and developing countries, different legal families (legal origins), cultural differ-
ences, politics, memberships in particular organizations (such as the EU) and 
geography.
73 The previous figures only confirm some of these reasons. Accord-
ing to these findings, there is, first, a difference between developed and devel-
oping countries, with the former countries usually performing better in protect-   
ing shareholders.
74 Second, shareholder protection in common law countries is 
relatively similar.
75 However, this need not to derive from “the common law”. 
As these countries share similarities in their history and culture whilst also shar-
ing English as a common legal language, it may just be the case that because of 
these reasons ideas “travel” more easily between these countries.
76 Further, it is 
worth noting, that there is no comparable similarity within the (allegedly) Ger-
man and French civil law countries.
77 Third, geographic and political “close-
ness” may account for some similarities within the European and within the 
Latin-American countries. However, this too has its limits because there are 
also  various  counter-examples,  for  example,  the  difference  between  German 
and French law in 1995.
78 
 
In order to provide a deeper understanding of the differences and developments, 
it is useful to analyze the recent changes in shareholder protection in their wider 
comparative and historical context. 
 
A. Distinction between origin and transplant countries 
The distinction between origin and transplant countries
79 assumes that, on the 
one hand in some countries the law has developed endogenously, i.e. without 
copying  the  laws  of  other  countries.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  countries 
which have just transplanted the law of one of these origin countries. This leads 
to different groups of countries which denote different legal families, such as 
English, French, and German legal origins. 
 
A critical analysis of this view, first, has to address whether in reality there are 
really different independent origin countries. For instance, it can be objected 
that the origins of corporate law were very similar in all “origin countries”, 
namely  the  establishment  of  colonial  corporations  by  English,  Dutch,  and 
French merchants.
80 Later on, interconnections between the different countries 
also continued, and thus it is no surprise that by the end of the 19
th century the 
most important features of corporate law were relatively uniform across coun-
tries.
81 Thus, one could validly make the point that in corporate law there is just 
one legal origin which only differs in detail. However, this does not mean that 
the concept of legal origins has to be disregarded completely. Even though these 
legal origins have not developed independently and are not fundamentally dis-
similar, there are still differences between English, French and German corpo-




Second the idea of transplant countries can be criticized because countries often 
do not simply copy the law of a particular origin country. The claim of a mere 
copying disregards (1) the on-going influence of their pre-transplant law, (2) the    
mixtures and modifications at the moment when some copying of foreign law 
takes place and (3) the post-transplant period, in which the transplanted law 
may be altered (or at least applied differently from the origin country).
83 How-
ever, there is also no denying the fact that, for instance, in corporate law at some 
point in time many Asian, African and American countries have copied a sig-
nificant part of their corporate law from one of the origin countries. Thus, al-
though this transplanted law is not completely identical to the corporate law of 
the origin country, and although it may have changed later on, one can also ac-
cept the didactic notion that there are English, French or German legal trans-
plant countries. 
 
B. Origin countries 
 
Figure 18: Shareholder protection in the last 150 years



















Figure 18 presents a simplified history of shareholder protection in the legal 
origin countries (i.e. the UK, Germany and France). It is based on the fact that 
shareholder protection has constantly improved in the last two centuries. Ini-
tially, the establishment of a company “only” depended on governmental or 
royal authorization. Thus, in all countries, there were no corporation acts which 
protected shareholders. This changed in the 19
th century and thus protection im-
proved.
84 Still, from today’s point of view the early Acts were incomplete and 
indeed every law reform extended them, and by doing this, shareholder protec-
tion has been strengthened as well. For instance, Pistor et al.
85 examined the de-
velopment of corporate law in the last two centuries and found a gradual im-
provement of shareholder protection in the UK, Germany and France. Applying 
a quantitative methodology, this is also the result of Lele and Siems for the pe-
riod from 1970 to 2005.
86    
C. Transplant countries 
It appears that the way in which shareholder protection develops in transplant 
countries follows one of the following three templates: 
 
 
Figure 19: Shareholder protection in the last 150 years















A first group of countries (“Type A transplant countries”) copied the law of one 
of the origin countries at one point in time and subsequently has not changed it 
significantly. This can also be seen in the figures above since some of the trans-
plant countries perform worse than their origin countries.
87 The extent of this 
weaker protection of shareholders depends on the “version” of the transplanted 
corporate law. For instance, a country which copied a foreign corporate law 
very recently (such as China
88) performs better than countries which have cop-
ied an older version of the law of their origin country decades or even centuries 
ago (such as most of the Latin American countries
89). 
 
The first and main reason why these countries have been apathetic is weak legal 
adaptability. This may be based on various factors related to the law-making 
procedure of a particular country, its political system and its courts.
90 Secondly, 
the  lack  of  change  may  also  be  caused  by  a  weak  relationship  between  the 
transplant and the origin country. In particular, if language hinders communica-
tion with the origin country – which is the case in most German and French le-
gal transplant countries – improvements of the law of the origin country may 
not have been noticed by the transplant country. Thirdly, legal improvements in 
shareholder protection are not always necessary. Not only has corporate law to 
balance different interests, but the legal protection of shareholders is also con-
nected with economic factors. For instance, in a country where there is hardly    
any dispersed shareholder ownership, the law on public takeovers only plays a 
marginal role, and it is also possible that in a particular country a lack of legal 




Figure 20: Shareholder protection in the last 150 years















A second group of countries (“Type B transplant countries”) follows the path of 
its origin country and, by doing this, improves its shareholder protection (but 
does not exceed the origin country in the level of protection). This can be based 
on its own independent decision but it is also likely that the on-going considera-
tion of the law of the origin country plays an important role. This influence is 
particularly strong if the origin and transplant country share common values and 
a common legal language. In the real world, this is the case in some of the 
common law countries, and thus explains, for example, the on-going (or even 
increasing) similarity between UK and Canadian, and UK and Malaysian corpo-
rate  law.
92  However,  this  development  is  neither  necessary  nor  restricted  to 
common law countries. Pakistan’s very low score
93 shows that within the com-
mon law family there is no “natural” following of the English path. Further-
more, there are also examples of “type B transplant countries” in the civil law 
world, such as the on-going influence of German corporate law on Austria
94 and 
the on-going influence of French corporate law on Luxembourg.
95 
    
Figure 21: Shareholder protection in the last 150 years















The third group of countries may be puzzling because here the transplant coun-
try gradually exceeds the level of shareholder protection of its origin country. 
Given the limited value of the distinction between origin and transplant coun-
tries
96 this potential development is, however, not surprising. For instance, the 
phenomenon of a “Type C transplant country” can be caused by the fact that 
two foreign countries subsequently influenced the law of this transplant country 
or that it deliberately decided to improve shareholder protection. A good real-
world example is Japan. In 1995 Japanese corporate law exceeded both German 
and US law
97 – which were transplanted to Japan 100 and 50 years ago respec-
tively.
98 It is also the case that Japan is not a mere transplant country any more. 
Noticeably, this can be seen in the 2005 reform (in force in 2006),
99 which de-







This article has analyzed how shareholder protection has developed in 20 coun-
tries from 1995 to 2005. In contrast to traditional legal research, it has drawn on 
a  quantitative  methodology  to  law  (“leximetrics”,  “numerical  comparative 
law”). Quantitative methods are no panacea and have inherit limits.
101 However, 
they can also lead to interesting results. The results of this study concern three 
levels: 
•  Aggregates: (1) In most countries shareholder protection has improved 
between 1995 and 2005. However, there appears to be an upper limit 
which countries do not exceed. (2) Most developed countries perform    
better than developing countries in protecting shareholders. However, in 
recent  years  developing  countries  are  catching  up  with  the  developed 
world.  
•  Differences: (1) Shareholder protection in common law countries is rela-
tively similar whereas there is no comparable similarity within the Ger-
man and French civil law families. (2) German corporate law is “more 
mainstream” than the law of the UK and France. “More eccentric” than 
these three countries is US corporate law. With respect to the differences 
from average, there is no clear-cut distinction between developed and de-
veloping  countries.  (3) Shareholder  protection  converged  until  2003. 
Then, however, convergence appeared to have stopped – although there 
are conflicting results. 
•  Explanations: (1) The distinction between origin and transplant countries 
can be used as a didactic device. (2) In the three origin countries (UK, 
Germany and France) shareholder protection has constantly improved in 
the last centuries. (3) For the transplant countries, (a) it is decisive which 
“version” of the corporate law of the origin countries they copied. (b) It 
also matters whether transplant countries continue to take developments 
in the origin countries into account and thus improve their law. In this re-
spect common law countries may have the advantage of common values 
and a common legal language. (c) Sometimes, however, transplant coun-
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